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DISCHARGE OF LATENT SURETIES ON NEGOTI-
ABLE INSTRUMENTS BECAUSE OF RELEASE
OR EXTENSION OF TIME*
By ELMER E. HILPERTt
A FAmIAR rule of suretyship discharges a surety from his obligation
if the creditor effectively releases or extends the time of payment to the
principal debtor without the surety's knowledge or consent. The rule
permitting discharge is also applied to accommodation drawers and in-
dorsers on commercial paper and to accommodation makers and acceptors
who patently describe their accommodation status on the instrument. This
Article addresses itself to the advisability of applying the rule of dis-
charge in favor of latent accommodation parties - those who sign in-
struments as makers or acceptors without adding words describing their
accommodation status.
While the relation of an accommodation party to a holder of com-
mercial paper is closely analogous to that of an ordinary surety and
creditor, yet "from the very nature of the transaction contemplated in
using a negotiable instrument, there may be certain suretyship equities
which are not applicable. The fields [of suretyship and negotiable in-
struments law] are not coextensive but overlapping."' The law of nego-
tiable instruments is governed by a policy which favors circulability above
other considerations. If the introduction into the negotiable instrument
field of the rule which discharges sureties conflicts with this policy, the
rule of discharge should yield and should not be applied to accommo-
dation parties,' despite their similarity to ordinary sureties. Early cases
under the Negotiable Instruments Law held that the statute had abolished
the rule of discharge. Vhether the common law cases which permitted
accommodation parties to interpose suretyship defenses were erroneously
decided and whether their effect was vitiated or modified by the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law3 are disputed points, whose resolution is deter-
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minative as to whether or not the rule permitting discharge should today
be restored by reinterpretation or amendment of the Act. The effect of
this rule of ordinary suretyship on commercial paper will, of course, vary,
as the holders' dealings with the parties accommodated are deemed
defenses available only to patent or to all accommodation parties, and
available against all or only some holders - results which depend on
the particular legal theory which is applied to the parties' relationship.
If the discharge is considered as resulting from the holder's breach
of his agreement to treat the accommodation party as surety by refraining
from conduct that would impair a surety's rights to reimbursement and
subrogation or increase his contemplated risk,4 the discharge will be avail-
able as a defensive plea only to patent accommodation parties; but it will
be available to them against all holders who effectively, release or extend
time to the accommodated parties without the accommodation parties'
knowledge or consent. Because of the barrier of the parol evidence rule,
discharge on this theory will be unavailable to latent accommodation
parties as a defense against any holder, since neither the holder's express
oral agreement to treat the accommodation party as surety, nor any agree-
ment to do so implied in fact from the holder's taking the instrument
with knowledge of the accommodation, can be established by proper proof.
Even less will discharge on this basis be available to a latent accommoda-
tion party as a defense against a holder who does not know of the ac-
commodation on acquiring the instrument, even though he learns of it
before he deals with the accommodated party.
If, however, the discharge is thought to result from the holder's viola-
tion of his duty to treat the accommodation party as surety-a duty
imposed in good conscience upon the holder by his mere knowledge of
the accommodation, quite apart from any agreement to the suretyship-
the discharge will be available as a defense to latent as well as patent
accommodation parties, because the existence of the holder's duty and
its violation can be properly established by parol proof. Yet, because of
"the very nature of the transaction contemplated in using a negotiable
instrument," the availability of the discharge as a defense against some
holders may, conceivably at least, depend on the time when the holder
acquired knowledge of the accommodation. If the plea of discharge is
regarded much as though it were a defense available against a holder
only if unforeclosed by negotiation of the instrument to him without
notice thereof, and if the holder's mere knowledge of the accommodation
4. The discharge of ordinary sureties was at first usually explained in terms of
sheer formalism-to avoid a circuity of actions. Later it was explained as resulting from
a rescission of the surety's contract or from the creditor's impairment of the surety's
rights to reimbursement and subrogation. ARANr, SuarEsHIP AND GUARANTY (1931)
179 et seq., 284 et seq. Arant suggests another approach-the increase-in-contemplated-
risk. Id. at 183 et seq., 287-288.
(Vol. 50: ;387388
DISCHARGE OF LATENT SURETIES
at the time of transfer to him is regarded as defeating his position as
a holder in due course free from such a "personal" defense, the dis-
charge will be available only against a holder who knows of the accom-
modation when he takes the instrument; and it will be unavailable against
a holder who does not learn of the accommodation until after transfer.
although he learns of it before he effectively releases the accommodated
party or extends time to him. The availability of the discharge as a
defense, under this view of the materiality of the time of acquiring
knowledge of the accommodation, would necessarily be peculiar to surety-
ship on negotiable commercial paper, if applicable to the question of a
surety's discharge at all.
But if the discharge is thought to result from the holder's own act,
coupled with knowledge of the accommodation when he acts, irrespective
of whether such knowledge is acquired before or after taking the in-
strument, the discharge will be available to any accommodation party as
a defense against the very holder-actor personally and not as a "personal"
defense forecloseable by negotiation of the instrument to him without
notice of it. In this view, the plea of discharge will be available to latent
as well as patent accommodation parties against original or remote holders
whether they can qualify as "holders in due course" by their lack of
knowledge of the accommodation at transfer or can qualify as holders
in due course in all respects.' If allowed as a defense to this extent, the
discharge, even if just when applied to latent sureties on ordinary obli-
gations, might conceivably be improperly applied to latent accommodation
makers and acceptors of negotiable commercial paper.
Each of these widely varying bases for the discharge of accommoda-
tion parties seems to have been considered by the courts at different times
before the passage of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Since the Act,
courts applying its various provisions seem to have been influenced by
kindred concepts of the appropriate occasion for their discharge. In its
application to patent accommodation parties, this suretyship defense pre-
sented no great difficulty before the statute; 6 and the discharge of ac-
commodation drawers and indorsers for release or extension of time to
accommodated makers or acceptors is expressly provided for in Section
120(5) and (6) of the Act. The troublesome question both before and
5. It is not suggested that mere knowledge of the accommodation is enough to defeat
a holder's position as holder in due course. The distinction between holders in due course
in all respects other than their knowledge of the accommodation on taking the instru-
ment and those who are holders in due course in "all respects" is used for convenience
in analysis only. See notes 11, 12, 84-87, and 99-105 infra.
6. 2 DANm.TI, NE-OTLBLE INSmTUmm.rS (4th ed. 1891) §§ 1303-1306 (accommoda-
tion drawers and indorsers) ; id. at § 1332 (accommodation makers and acceptors adding
"surety," or the like, to their signatures). As to these latter under the Negotiable In-
struments Law, see p. 395 infra.
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since the adoption of the Act has been whether or not to permit the
discharge of latent accommodation parties.
DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF THE
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
Although Lord Mansfield decided two cases in the Court of King's
Bench which dealt with the discharge of latent sureties,' neither of them
sheds any light on the precise reason for a latent accommodation party's
discharge. In 1809, after Lord Mansfield's death, the issue was raised
at nisi prius in Laxton v. Peat,' an action by the indorsee of a bill of
exchange against the latent accommodation acceptor. In holding the plea
of discharge because of the indorsee's extension of time to the accom-
modated drawer to be a good defense to the action, Lord Ellenborough
emphasized the fact that the indorsee had knowledge of the acceptor's
accommodation character when he took the bill "so that he was not
deceived thereby." Whether this emphasis should be taken to mean that
the indorsee had discharged the acceptor by his breach of an implied
in fact agreement to treat the acceptor as surety, or that a defense fore-
closeable only by negotiation of the bill without notice thereof had been
successfully interposed, does not clearly appear from the report.
Whatever its basis, even the result in Laxton v. Peat was soon doubted ;'
and, on the issue being presented in 1813 to the Court of Common Pleas
in Fentum v. Pocock,10 Sir James Mansfield, C. J., overruled Laxton v.
Peat to hold the latent accommodation acceptor's plea of discharge, be-
cause of the plaintiff indorsee's extension of time to the accommodated
drawer, ineffective as a defense to the action. Although he recognized
that the two cases were factually distinguishable, since in the one before
him the indorsee had not known of the acceptor's accommodation char-
acter when he took the bill but had learned of it before he extended time
to the accommodated drawer, the Chief Justice refused to make any legal
distinction between them.
If the basis for the surety's discharge is the successful interposition
of a "personal" defense "available to prior parties among themselves,"
the cases were significantly distinguishable in that such a defense had
not been foreclosed by negotiation without knowledge of its existence
or source in Laxton v. Peat and had been so foreclosed in Fentum v.
Pocock. But the mere fact of accommodation itself is not a "personal"
7. Dingwall v. Dunster, 1 Dougl. 247 (K. B. 1779) ; Ellis v. Galindo, 1 Dougl. 250,
note (K. B. 1783).
8. 2 Camp. 185 (K. B. 1809).
9. Kerrison v. Cooke, 3 Camp. 362 (C. P. 1813); Raggett v. Axmore, 4 Taunt.
730 (Ex. Ch. 1813).
10. 5 Taunt. 192 (Ex. Ch. 1813), followed as controlling in Carstairs v. Rolleston,
5 Taunt. 551. (Ex. Ch. 1814).
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defense, even against an original payee who is a holder for value ;" nor
is it alone the source of such a defense. Since the discharge of an ac-
commodation party does not arise out of the holder's mere knowledge
of the accommodation unless followed by his own act of releasing or
extending time to the accommodated party, the discharge is a defense
against the holder-actor personally and not a "personal" defense in the
sense of being forecloseable as to him by negotiation without notice
thereof. If such defense against the holder-actor personally results from
his violation of a duty which his mere knowledge of the accommodation
imposes on him in equity, it should not have mattered in Fenturn v.
Pocock that the indorsee acquired that knowledge after the bill was trans-
ferred to him. It is true that under this view Fenturn v. Pocock and
Laxton v. Peat would have been legally indistinguishable; but Fen tum
v. Pocock should then have been governed by Laxton v. Peat and should
even have extended its scope.' But if the discharge results from the
holder's breach of his agreement to treat the latent accommodation maker
or acceptor as surety, that agreement could not, because of the parol
evidence rule, have been established by proper proof in either Fen tum
v. Pocock or Laxton v. Peat. In this view, the cases were indeed legally
indistinguishable, and Laxton v. Peat was properly overruled in Fenturn
v. Pocock.
Under this view of the nature of the discharge, implicit in the result
of Fenturn v. Pocock, an extension of time to the accommodated party
would not operate to discharge the latent accommodation maker or ac-
ceptor even as against an original payee who had made an express oral
agreement to treat the accommodation party as surety. After having
been several times unsuccessfully questioned,' 3 this view was made explicit
and adopted by the Court of Queen's Bench in Manley v. Boycot.'4 Since
the promotion of negotiability is to be found in protecting the interests
of the holder in due course rather than the original payee, the rule in
Fenturn v. Pocock and Manley v. Boycot therefore does not seem to have
been formulated out of regard for preserving circulability. Nor do the
reports of either case make any mention of the possibly deterrent effect
of a contrary rule on the currency of negotiable instruments. Indeed,
the same reasoning would and did support the denial of the discharge
to a latent surety debtor on a non-negotiable bond.
The equity courts, however, seem early to have had a different under-
standing of the theory underlying a latent surety's discharge." In any
11. See NwOTIABLE INsTmuM.ars LAW § 29.
12. See notes 22 and 23 infra.
13. Price v. Edmunds, 10 B. & C. 578 (K. B. 1830); Nichols v. Norris, 3 B. & Ad.
41 (K. B. 1831); Harrison v. Courtauld, 3 B. & Ad. 36 (K. B. 1832).
14. 2 E. & B. 46 (Q. B. 1853); see Rolfe v. Wyatt, 5 C. & P. 181 (C. P. 1831).
15. Loyd, The Surety (1917) 66 U. OF PA. L. Rzv. 40; Comment (1925) 38 HALv.
L. REv. 954, 958. But see 2 HARE & ,VALLACE, Ais. L. CAs. (5th ed. 1871) 431, 432.
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event, in 1855 the Court of Appeal in Chancery in Davies v. Stainbank'0
applied its doctrine, already approved in the House of Lords as respects
an ostensible principal obligor of a bond,'17 to find the latent accommo-
dation acceptor discharged because of the holder's extension of time to
the accommodated drawer. Since the written contract between the holder
and acceptor as embodied in the bill "could not be varied in equity any
more than at law,"'" the accommodation acceptor's discharge in Chan-
cery must either have resulted from the holder's violation of an equitably
imposed duty not to extend time to the real debtor or release him after
knowing him to be such, or have involved a return to the questionable
position of Laxton v. Peat. Later cases made it plain that the former,
and not the latter theory underlay the surety's discharge in Chancery;
but this development occurred in the law courts under the statute author-
izing the interposition of equitable pleas to actions at law.' 9
In 1857 the Court of Queen's Bench, in Pooley v. Harradine,20 allowed
under such an equitable plea the discharge of an accommodation co-
maker against the payee who, though he had not even orally agreed to
the suretyship, knew of it when he extended the time of payment. Since
the holder's own knowledge of the accommodation raised the duty not
to release the principal debtor or extend the time of payment to him,
2'
it was immaterial whether the holder acquired such knowledge before or
after taking the instrument: the discharge was not based on a "personal
defense" that could be cut off by transfer without notice thereof, and
there was no need to imply an agreement by the holder to the accom-
modation party's position as surety. Because this duty to the accom-
modation maker or acceptor was imposed on the holder in equity and
did not rest on any express or implied in fact contract between the
parties, parol evidence proving the existence of the suretyship relation,
the holder's knowledge thereof, and his subsequent release of, or ex-
tension of time to, the accommodated party did not contradict or other-
wise affect the accommodation party's liability on the instrument as maker
or acceptor. Parol evidence was therefore properly admissible to estab-
lish the accommodation party's discharge from further liability as known
surety.
This theory would support the discharge of an accommodation maker
or acceptor not merely as against a payee, or even against an indorsee
16. 6 DeG. M. & G. 679 (C. A. 1855).
17. Oakley v. Pasheller, 4 Cl. & Fin. 207 (H. L. 1836); Hollier v. Eyre, 9 Cl. &
Fin. 1 (H. L. 1842).
18. Pooley v. Harradine, 7 E. & B. 431, 433 (Ex. Ch. 1857).
19. 17 & 18 Vicr., c. 125 (1854).
20. 7 E. & B. 431 (1857), followed as controlling in Taylor v. Burgess, 5 H. & N. 1
(Ex. 1859); Greenough v. McClelland, 2 El. & El. 424 (Q. B. 1860).
21. And this may reasonably be so expressed whether the duty is not to impair the
surety's rights of reimbursement and subrogation, as stated in Pooley v. Harradine, or
not to increase the surety's contemplated-risk, as suggested by Arant. See note 4 supra.
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who knew of the latent suretyship when he took the instrument, but
also against an indorsee who learned of the suretyship only after he
acquired the instrument but before he extended the time of payment to
the real debtor or released him from liability. And this was expressly
held in 1864 by the Court of Queen's Bench in Bailey v. Edwards2- on
the authority of Pooley v. Harradine, and again by the same court the
next year in Ewin v. Lancaster.' It has ever since been the law in
England that a latent accommodation maker or acceptor will be deemed
discharged by any holder of the instrument who, after having acquired
knowledge of the suretyship relation, releases the accommodated party
or extends the time of payment to him. 4
In the United States the discharge was often at first denied in law
courts, largely because of the influence of Fentun 2,. Pocock -,2  aided no
doubt by the mistaken belief that it had been decided by the illustrious
Lord Mansfield 2" and so was entitled to especial respect on commercial
matters. But, in equity, the discharge seems to have been regularly allowed
here as early as in England. 7 In several instances, it was allowed here
in law courts even before Pooley v. Harradine was decided in Eng-
land ;2' and in at least one of these an American law court, dearly
recognizing the theory underlying the rule, allowed the discharge as
against an indorsee who learned of the suretyship only after he had ac-
quired the instrument but before he extended the time of payment to
the real debtor.29 A number of later cases extended the scope of the
22. 4 B. & S. 761 (Ex. Ch. 1864).
23. 6 B. & S. 571 (Q. B. 1865) (reviews the cases and gives complete exposition of
the theory underlying them).
24. Oriental Fin. Corp. v. Overend, Gurney & Co., L. R. 7 Ch. App. 142 (1871),
aff'd, L. R. 7 Eng. & Ir. App. 348 (1874) ; see also Swire v. Redman, 1 Q. B. D. 536 (1876).
See generally CHAI.axERs, BILus OF EXCHANGE (8th ed. 1919) 251 ci seq.
25. Many times cited in American courts as controlling. See, e.g., Cronise v. Kel-
logg, 20 I1. 11 (1858); Lambert v. Sandford, 2 Blackf. 137 (Ind. 1828); Clopper's
Adm'r v. Union Bank, 7 Harris & J. 92 (Md. 1826); Hoge v. Lansing, 35 N. Y. 136
(1866).
26. Daniel attributed Fentiun v. Pocock to Lord (William Murray) Mansfield and
stressed the importance of this through five editions. 2 DAN.tEL, N~roTABu Ismu-
IENTs (5th ed. 1903) §§ 1333, 1334. Lord Mansfield was Chief Justice of King's Bench
from 1756 to 1788, and died in 1793, twenty years before Fentum z,. Pocock. The error
was omitted Without comment in the sixth edition (1913), but the draftsmen of the Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law referred to the fourth edition. Bra.NA.' s NEMOTIADLE IN-
STRUMENTS LAw (6th ed. 1938) Commissioners' INotes.
27. Yates v. Donaldson, 5 Afd. 389 (1854); Farrington v. Gallaway, 10 Ohio 543
(1841); Wilson v. Green, 25 Vt. 450 (1853); Glenn v. Morgan, 23 W. Va. 467 (1884).
28. Branch Bank v. James, 9 Ala. 949 (1846); Adle v. Vletoyer, 1 La. Ann. 254
(1846) (based on civil law doctrines); Mariners' Bank v. Abbott, 28 Mfe. 280 (1848) ;
Harris v. Brooks, 21 Pick. 195 (Mass. 1838) ; Grafton Bank v. Kent, 4 N. H. 221 (1827).
29. Wheat v. Kendall, 6 N. H. 504 (1834) (decided on authority of Grafton Bank
v. Kent, 4 N. H. 221 (1827), Wherein plaintiff was payee).
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rule to such an indorsee;3° and in many other cases the theory of deci-
sion was, as in Pooley v. Harradine, equally applicable to indorsees with
knowledge subsequent to transfer, although such indorsees were not
involved in the cases.3 1 In brief, the development was generally much
the same as in England: the rule was often initially equitable in origin;
its introduction into law courts, while accomplished in some instances
by "natural" processes, was here also accelerated by the gradual adoption
of a reformed procedure and made complete by the union of law and
equity under the codes ;2 and the same rationale for it was finally worked
out and accepted.3
EARLY DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW- SO-CALLED MAJORITY RULE
The first courts to apply the Negotiable Instruments Law to this situa-
tion, however, purported to find in its provisions a complete denial of the
accommodation maker's or acceptor's discharge as sureties.3 4  These
courts' interpretation of the Negotiable Instruments Law was, at best,
a matter of construing the Act from a bare reading of its most obviously
30. Hall v. Capital Bank, 71 Ga. 715 (1883) ; Lauman, Hedges & Co. v. Nichols, 15
Iowa 161 (1863); Meggett v. Baum, 57 Miss. 22 (1879); Bank of Mo. v. Matson, 26
Mo. 243 (1858) ; Westervelt v. Frech, 33 N. J. Eq. 451 (1881) (in equity).
31. See cases collected in Hening, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Is It
Producing Uniformity and Certainty in the Law Merchant? (1911) 59 U. oF PA. L. REv.
532, 535, n. 100. See especially Canadian Bank v. Coumbe, 47 Mich. 358 (1882) ; Graf-
ton Bank v. Kent, 4 N. H. 221 (1827) ; Hubbard v. Gurney, 64 N. Y. 457 (1876).
-32. See Rose v. Williams, 5 Kan. 483 (1870).
33. It is, perhaps, best stated in the early case of Grafton Bank v. Kent, 4 N. H.
221 (1827), taken together with Wheat v. Kendall, 6 N. H. 504 (1834), which applied
it in its widest scope.
There was no serious conflict of decisions on the question of discharge requiring
resolution by the Negotiable Instruments Law. An apparent conflict existed because, as
in England, the discharge was at first denied at law in jurisdictions allowing it in equity.
See cases cited supra note 27. Apparent conflicts are readily resolved if the decisions are
viewed chronologically rather than merely cumulatively, as a whole, or in the develop-
ment in a given jurisdiction. See, e.g., in New York, King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384
(N. Y. 1819); Howard Banking Co. v. Welchman, 6 Bos. 280 (N. Y. 1860); Hoge v.
Lansing, 35 N. Y. 136 (1866). The latter two cases, which were decided on the author-
ity of Fentum v. Pocock, were overruled and the doctrine of Pooley v. Harradine estab-
lished in the leading case of Hubbard v. Gurney, 64 N. Y. 457 (1876). Decisions allow-
ing the discharge only against original payees, or indorsees with knowledge of the ac-
commodation when they took the instruments, did not necessarily conflict with decisions
allowing it even against indorsees who learned of the accommodation after transfer. See
cases cited supra note 31. To the extent that there was a real conflict, the jurisdictions
denying the discharge were distinctly in the minority; and even in these the discharge
seems to have been allowed at least in equity by the time of the Negotiable Instruments
Law. See Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1900) 14 HARV. L. REy. 241, 255.
34. Celers v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907); Vanderford v. Farmers'
& Mech. Nat. Bank, 105 Md. 164, 66 AtI. 47 (1907).
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pertinent terms.3 5 Section 192 was thought to divide all parties to nego-
tiable instruments into two classes: those primarily and those secondarily
liable on the instrument.3 Since Section 120 expressly provides for the
discharge of parties secondarily liable because of release or extension of
time, whereas no section similarly provides for the discharge of parties
primarily liable, application of the maxim c.rpressio unius est exclusio
alterius was thought to prevent the discharge of parties primarily liable
on these grounds. Significance was also attached to the juxtaposition of
Section 119, which provides for the discharge of the instrument (and,
necessarily, the discharge of all parties) as a further indication that
parties primarily liable were to be discharged only as an incident to the
discharge of the instrument by payment or its accepted equivalents.3"
This interpretation not only restored the result of Fenium v. Pocock
and Manley v. Boycot by denying the discharge of latent accommoda-
tion makers and acceptors as against original payees - it went even
further. Its literal application would, and in certain cases did, exceed
both the rigor and the reason of Fentum zt. Pocock and Manley v. Boycot
by denying the discharge even to accommodation makers who added the
word "surety" to their signatures on the face of the instrument Ps
Still, except perhaps for these extreme cases, there is reason to believe
that the draftsmen of the Act intended this interpretation of Sections
192, 119, and 120. The draftsmen consulted Dani on Negotiable Iz-
struments, which approved the result of Fcntum v. Pocock and Manley
35. Not even this can be said for some of the variant statements of the problem.
Some courts attached significance in this connection to §§29, 60. See, e.g., Cowan v.
Ramsey, 15 Ariz. 533, 140 Pac. 501 (1914); Wolstenholme v. Smith, 34 Utah 300, 97
Pac. 329 (1908). Section 60 (or 62) adds nothing to the argument already met in Poolcy
v. Harradine, supra, and § 29 does not preclude an accommodation party from asserting
defenses other than the mere want of consideration for the instrument running directly
to him. See p. 408 in!ra.
36. This grouping alone has been said to exclude any other category and so abolish
suretyship in negotiable instruments altogether. See, e.g., Richards v. Market Exch. Bank,
81 Ohio St. 348, 90 N. E. 1000 (1910); Cellers v. Meacheni, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426
(1907). But such an appeal to Section 192 succeeds in proving too much; for surety
parties have not been deprived of their rights of reimbursement and subrogation because
of the lack of express provision in the Negotiable Instruments Law. See Notes (1925)
36 A. L. R. 553, (1932) 77 A. L. R. 668, (1931) 72 A. L. R. 1063.
37. The elliptical statement of this result in some cases seems to have induced a
belief in others that the discharge of parties primarily liable, as such, is provided for
in Section 119 and that the discharge for releases or extensions is denied because these
grounds are not enumerated therein. See, e.g., Sloan v. Gates, 166 Tenn. 446, 62 S. W.
(2d) 52 (1933); Continental Mut. Say. Bank v. Elliott, 166 Wash. 283, 6 P. (2d) 638
(1932). This misconception of Section 119 may be seen as early as Vanderford v. Far-
mers' & Mech. Nat. Bank, 105 Ald. 164, 66 Ad. 47 (1907).
38. Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907) ; Lenoir v. Cannon, 4 Hig-
gins 509 (Tenn. Civ. App. 1913); see 2 Dzxrna, NEGOTIBMr IN 5TRU2NTXTS LAw (4th
ed. 1891) § 1332.
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v. Boycot,0 and referred to this work as authority." Again, Dean Ames'
criticism of the Act anticipated this interpretation ;41 and Eaton, one of
the chief proponents of the Act, accepted this interpretation in defending
the Act against the Dean's strictures. It embodied one line of authority,
he said, not necessarily wrong because it disagreed with the distinguished
Dean's view of the proper rule.42 Finally, when the early decisions an-
nouncing this interpretation were criticised, the chief draftsman4" and
a committee44 of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws rose to their defense. Indeed, "To suggest that Homer nodded in
the draughting of this section, and that the expression 'person second-
arily liable' in the opening sentence of § 120 was used inadvertently in
the Common-Law sense of 'secondary party' (or surety), and not in the
sense of the definition of § 192, would be an improper reflection on the
learned draughtsman of the section.""
But, intended or not, the ready acceptance of this interpretation of
Sections 192, 119 and 120 is to be attributed as much to the force of
repetition as to any real examination of the pertinent provisions of the
Act in the light of the state and effect of the prior law, the scope and
purposes of its codification, and the effect of the interrelation of these
factors on the formulation of a satisfactory rule on the point. In 1907
the Oregon court in Cellers v. Meachem4" found a "ready-made" inter-
pretation of Sections 192, 119 and 120 awaiting it,47 remarked merely
that it did not fit its own prior law, failed to note that it was of the
same cut as Fentum v. Pocock, long since out-moded even in courts of
law,48 and wore it for an occasion for which Fentum v. Pocock itself
had never been designed. In the same year the Maryland court, in
Vanderford v. Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank,"° arrived at this
39. 2 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1891) § 1337.
40. BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (6th ed. 1938) 65, Commissioners'
Notes (d) and (e) to § 120.
41. Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1900) 14 HARV. L. RE%,. 241, 255.
42. Eaton, The Negotiable Instrumnents Law: Its History and Its Practical Opera-
tion (1904) 2 MICH. L. REv. 260.
43. CRAWFORD, NEGOTIA3LE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED (4th ed. 1916) 201.
44. Report of the Committee on Uniformity of Judicial Decisions in Cases Arishing
under Uniform Laws (1914) 1 A. B. A. J. 24, 41-43.
45. BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES, AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) 497, n. 2. But see p. 412
infra.
46. 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907).
47. EATON & GILBERT, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
(1903) § 123f.
48. EATON & GIIBERT found in Sections 192, 119, and 120 the resolution of a "conflict"
which their citation of authorities reveal was merely the ancient conflict between courts
of law and equity, long since resolved. The authorities they cite do not even reveal the
true state of the decisions at law at that time.
49. 2 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1891) 348-349.
50. 105 Md. 164, 66 Atl. 47 (1907).
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same interpretation, apparently quite independently of the Cellers case.
Maryland, however, was one of the few jurisdictions which, at the time
of adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law, had neither reformed
its procedure nor departed from the doctrine of Fnlton v. Pocock in its
law courts, although it seems to have allowed the discharge in equity
as early as 1854.51 Thus other jurisdictions might very reasonably have
viewed the Vanderford case as signifying merely that in Maryland the
discharge was still available only in equity; for, if the Act did not other-
wise deny the discharge of accommodation makers and acceptors, its
failure to provide expressly for their discharge in statute law would not
preclude the continued applicability of an cquity which had existed before
the Negotiable Instruments Law. 2
Yet the Cellers and Vanderford cases were followed by the Utah court
in the following year, 3 and in 1910 the tide of precedent overwhelmed
the Ohio and Washington courts into refusals to discharge accommo-
dation makers and acceptors." By 1912 it remained only for the Massa-
chusetts court 55 to deliver the classic statement of this interpretation of
Sections 192, 119 and 120 to cause a rapid succession of courts to board
the bandwagon,"0 though this meant the disavowal of their own prior law
and "the law generally in this country."517 In doing so, the courts fre-
quently parroted the assertions that negotiability, justice, and, certainly,
uniformity, would be promoted by refusing to discharge accommodation
makers and acceptors. " The mere force of these early cases alone almost
invariably precluded the courts from an original examination of the pro-
visions of the Negotiable Instruments Law or the validity of their
justifying assertions.5 9
51. Yates v. Donaldson, 5 Md. 389 (1854).
52. The Negotiable Instruments Law has been held in another connection to state the
law but not to preclude equitable remedies. See Knaffle v. Knoxville Banking & Trust
Co., 128 Tenn. 181, 159 S. V. 838 (1913).
53. ,Volstenholme v. Smith, 34 Utah 300, 97 Pac. 329 (1908).
54. Richards v. Market Exch. Bank Co., 81 Ohio St. 348, 90 N. E. 1000 (1910);
Bradley Eng. & Mlfg. Co. v. Heyburn, 56 Wash. 628, 106 Pac. 170 (1910).
55. Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N. E. 679 (1912), cited as the
"best expression!' of the purpose and effect of the Negotiable Instruments Law in Sich-
erman, Construction of Clause in Uniform State Laws Providing for Uniformity of In-
terpretation (1916) 2 A. B. A. J. 60, 72.
56. See successive annotations in Notes (1927) 48 A. L. R. 715, (1930) 65 A. L. R.
1425, (1937) 108 A. L. R. 1088.
57. Wolstenholme v. Smith, 34 Utah 300, 302, 97 Pac. 329, 330 (1903).
58. See cases cited note 3 supra.
59. While the rolling-snowball effect of the Cellers and Vandcrford cases may be
seen in many, if not most, later cases, see especially Mortgage Guar. Co. Y. Chotiner,
8 Cal. (2d) 110, 64 P. (2d) 138 (1936); Fox v. Terre Haute Nat. Bank, 78 Ind. App.
666, 129 N. E. 33 (1920) ; Citizens' Bank v. Bowden, 98 Kan. 140, 157 Pac. 429 (1916).
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THE JUSTICE OR INJUSTICE OF THE RULE PERMITTING DISCHARGE
The assertion that the side of justice lies with Fentum v. Pocock,
Manley v. Boycot, and the earlier Negotiable Instruments Law rule, rather
than with the rule of Pooley v. Harradine, will not bear very close
scrutiny. It is said that to allow the latent accommodation maker to
claim the status of surety would be to set a trap for the unwary lender,
and that to deny him that status would be no more than to insist that
the accommodation maker observe the very letter of his contract.
This argument, already met in Pooley v. Harrzadine, overlooks the
very occasion for the operation of the rule of that case. To be able
to insist on the very letter of the contract embodied in the instrument,
the holder need merely refrain from prejudicing the accommodation
maker after he knows his status. To say that this would allow the rights
and liabilities of the parties to be lightly shaken by parol proof is to
misapprehend, as did the law courts before Pooley v. Harradihe, the
nature of the parol evidence rule, disregard the wide scope for the proper
function of parol proof, and underestimate the protection afforded the
holder by imposing upon the accommodation party the burden of proving
the facts entitling him to be discharged. This suggests that a factual
study of the effect of the rule which permits discharge might well have
preceded its abolition.6"
Conceding for a moment that it is "a trap for the unwary lender"
to allow the latent accommodation co-maker to claim the status of surety,
this argument affords no support for those decisions which deny the
discharge to accommodation makers or co-makers who add the word
"surety," or the like, to their signatures. Moreover, it seems clear that,
where the discharge is claimed by an accommodation maker because of
a release or an extension of time to a person not appearing as a party
to the instrument, the holder cannot fail to know that the maker stands
as surety to the person with whom he dealt. As a matter of fact, the
holder will generally know of the suretyship relation where the accom-
modated party, to whom time is extended or a release granted, is a payee-
indorser - or even a co-maker. This suggests a possible factual study
concerning the holder's knowledge of the co-maker's surety status.
If the holder wishes to avoid "all of the difficulties attendant upon
proving whether in a particular case the holder had notice of the accom-
60. See Hening, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Is It Producing Uni-
formity and Certainty in the Law Merchantf (1911) 59 U. oF PA. L. Rnv. 532, 536:
"Rules of commercial law and of suretyship, so long continued, so widely adopted and
so generally regarded by our courts as being consonant with justice should never have
been overthrown unless upon a demonstration that the American courts had all along been
deceived by perjurers into discharging parties to commercial paper who pretended to be
sureties, but were in reality, as in appearance, primarily liable."
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modation character of the signing,"' he should abide by the very con-
tract he would later wish to enforce against one who on the face of the
instrument appears as co-debtor, sole debtor, or sole primary debtor. He
should proceed against the party by the terms of the instrument "abso-
lutely required to pay the same," or at least obtain that primary party's
consent to any extensions or releases he proposes to grant to another
who may not be a party to the instrument at all, or may be only second-
arily liable as payee-indorser, or, at best, may be only primary co-debtor
and not primary sole debtor. And, if he wishes only to be a forbearing
creditor, the holder need not fear the consequences of his mere indulgence
to the accommodated debtor.
2
Quite apart from its special application to commercial paper, the dis-
charge because of release or extension of time may be objectionable on
the ground that the accommodation party may not be injured by the
extension or release.3 Yet the real objections may be reached by modi-
fying the operation of the right of discharge without abrogating it en-
tirely- a method which will enable a court to balance the equities of
a situation."
A release or an extension of time may cause a surety no actual damage
-the extension, if it assures ultimate payment by the principal debtor,
may even be a distinct advantage to the surety."5 But in certain situa-
tions, such as that in which the principal debtor's financial strength is
declining, a release or extension of time may be positively detrimental to
the surety.6 To avoid permitting the surety to blow both hot and cold -
remaining silent when an extension is granted, which may the better
enable the principal debtor to pay; yet claiming a discharge when, despite
the extension, the surety is nevertheless called upon to pay - certain
vigilance might be demanded of him on pain of being otherwise deemed
to have consented to the extension. 7 Or, if the surety is not deprived
of his right to reimbursement upon payment -since the deprivation of
this right is certainly no less "technical" than granting the discharge -
all reason for the discharge disappears because no actual prejudice will
61. Turner [Steffen], A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amendments to the
Negotiable Instruments Law (1929) 38 Y A L. J. 1047, 1056.
62. 3 DANIEL, NoTIABLE INsTRUMENTs (7th ed. 1933) § 1527.
63. 4 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs (rev. ed. 1936) § 1222.
64. See CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 152 (directed to
modifying the operation of the discharge, not its abolition).
65. As is pointed out in Sloan v. Gates, 166 Tenn. 446, 62 S. WV. (2d) 52 (1933)
(denying the discharge under the Negotiable Instruments Law).
66. See Scandinavian Amer. Bank v. Westby, 41 N. D. 276, 172 N. W. 665 (1918)
(involves surrender of collateral).
67. E.g., requiring him to tender payment at maturity (see CRwozo, Trg NA'rturE or
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 153) or, at least to object seasonably to the extension of
time if he knows, or should know of it. But see Note (1936) 101 A. L. R. 1310.
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result to the vigilant surety."8 The best solution seems to be to grant a
discharge only to the extent of a showing of actual damage."
The argument may be made that the earlier rule under the Negotiable
Instruments Law will work equally well, once it is established and known
to parties to borrowing transactions. Those who lend their credit
to others will learn, the argument runs, that if they sign as accommo-
dation indorsers they will be entitled to the favored status of surety, but
that, if they sign as accommodation makers, they are impliedly consent-
ing to a possible release or extension of time.70 That, at least as to
an extension of time, was one justification for the rule of Fentum v.
Pocock.7 ' Does it square with the plain everyday facts of life? If it
does there was no real injustice in the rule of Fentum v. Pocock and
there was none in the earlier rule under the Negotiable Instruments Law.
A factual analysis made by Professor Steffen to determine just what
is the general understanding of the effect of signing as accommodation
maker rather than as indorser indicates, although admittedly not at all
conclusively, that it is in accord with the differentiation in their positions
made in the early interpretation of Sections 192, 119 and 120 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law. 72 A questionnaire, containing the follow-
ing interrogatories, was sent "to some two hundred and fifty banks, trust
companies, bond and investment houses, and one hundred and fifty
lawyers and to teachers in Association schools giving the negotiable
instruments course-a matter all told of about four hundred ques-
tionnaires":
-(a) In your experience, do accommodation parties now assume
that in signing as maker or co-maker their obligation is greater than
if they signed on the back of the paper as endorser?
"(b) If so, is this accounted for by the fact that, as endorser,
an accommodation signer is entitled to notice of dishonor, while,
as maker or co-maker, he is not?
68. See Finzer v. Peter, 120 Neb. 389, 232 N. W. 762 (1930) (surety maker allowed
to proceed against principal debtor despite binding extension of time which had pre-
viously been held not to discharge surety). Compare Mallet v. Thompson, 5 Esp. 178
(K. B. 1804).
69. 4 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 1222; CARDOZO, TiH NATURE OF
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) 153. But see ARANT, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (1931)
287 suggesting that release gives a complete discharge where the standard business prac-
tice seems clear. Whether extension of time would discharge the surety depends on what
is found to be standard business practice--a determination which seems to require ,in ex-
tended factual survey.
70. See Turner [Steffen], Revision of the Negotiable Instruments Law (1928) 38
YALE L. J. 25, 47-49. This Article was followed by a factual analysis of the validity of
the underlying assumption. Turner [Steffen], A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed
Amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Law (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1047, 1056-1058.
71. 2 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1891) § 1333a, n. 2.
72. Turner [Steffen], A Factual Analysis of Certain Proposed Amnendmcnts to the
Negotiable Instruments Law (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 1047, 1056-1058.
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"(c) Is it convenient commercially to provide either of two pos-
sible contracts for the accommodation signer, depending on his
bargain, as is done in most states; that is, if he signs as endorser,
to accord him the protection of any signer in that capacity, but, if
he signs as maker or co-maker, to provide that he assumes the
obligation of a primary party and is not discharged, for example,
because of an extension of time?
"(d) Is there any injustice in denying suretyship defenses to the
accommodation maker?"
73
In response to the first two interrogatories, over "three to one of the
total replies indicated the existence of such a general understanding."
Professor Steffen rcmarks that "this general finding has considerable
support also in the opinions of the majority courts in which it is said
that the accommodation maker in so signing assumes a 'primary obli-
gation,' " and that "evidently this is more than a technical view.""4 But
it has never been denied that the accommodation maker is a party pri-
marily liable on the instrument. The discovery, at great labor, that he
is a party primarily liable adds nothing to the argument and leaves
unanswered the fundamental question of whether, in signing as accom-
modation maker rather than as indorser, he understands that he has
impliedly consented to a release of the principal debtor or an extension
of time.
Interrogatory (c) is thought to have raised the issue squarely;, but
it is doubtful whether it did so, even in conjunction with interrogatories
(a) and (b). Interrogatory (a) was so generally phrased that an affirm-
ative response may indicate no more than that an accommodation maker's
obligation is regarded as more onerous than an accommodation indorser's
because the former is not entitled to notice of dishonor, as suggested by
interrogatory (b) itself. Interrogatory (c) may have done no more
than raise the question of "commercial convenience" in the minds of
those responding.
"Among the teachers the affirmative vote was greater," Professor
Steffen states, "but the attorneys by a majority of three favored the
contrary view that a 'surety' is entitled to the usual suretyship defenses
regardless of the capacity in which he signs. The answers to (d) con-
cerning the possible injustice of the majority rule were colored largely
by the view taken of the parties' understanding of the situation. The
bankers who thought that accommodation parties now understand their
obligations to be greater as maker than as indorser answered that there
was no injustice in denying such signers suretyship defenses. This
amounted to saying that a signing as maker constituted a waiver of
73. Id. at 1056-1057.
74. Id. at 1057.
75. Ibid.
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these defenses." 6 From all of this Professor Steffen concludes that,
"although this evidence, taken as a whole, cannot of course be regarded
as at all conclusive, it certainly affords little support for the proposed
amendment on the point [which would restore the rule prior to the
Negotiable Instruments Law]. It would be better to change the rule
in the minority states to accord with that generally obtaining." 77
If the general understanding is as stated, the conclusion which Pro-
fessor Steffen draws clearly follows. The evidence from the survey does
indeed "afford little support" for the contrary conclusion; but the present
writer questions, even beyond the point conceded, the validity of the
evidence upon which Professor Steffen bases his conclusion. In doing
so, he is fully aware that he himself has not made a survey any more
scientific in method and that he bases his conclusion on traditional legal
analysis confirmed only by impressions gained from casual observations.
But the writer's viewpoint is not disturbed by the survey made, not merely
because of the inconclusiveness of its results or the failure of the inter-
rogatories, in his opinion, to raise the basic issue squarely, but because
of what he deems fatal weaknesses in the survey's method, which render
its results undependable as well as inconclusive.
In the first place, the group questioned has too high a degree of "selec-
tivity." To have real value statistically, the group questioned, although
"sampled," should not have been "selected." By far the larger element
in the group may well have been drawn from that segment of the popula-
tion least likely ever to have functioned as accommodation parties. Indeed,
the larger element in the group was of the lender rather than the bor-
rower class- or at least responded in the capacity of lenders. Even the
responses of the lawyers, if divided as their answers have been to the
writer's casual inquiries, might be found to "break down" into the
responses of "plaintiffs' " or "defendants' " lawyers. Their division over
question (d) is some indication to one not having the original data before
him that they did so divide. The number of lawyers' affirmative responses
added to those of the bankers would, because of the "weighting" of the
group numerically in favor of bankers, itself explain the three to one
response to the first interrogatory (admitting for the moment that it
raised the fundamental point at issue). The division in the vote of the
teachers is more difficult to explain away; but it is believed that sufficient
statistical undependability of method has been suggested to venture a
further caveat of the result.
Indeed, it might have been proper in this situation to resort to "selec-
tivity" of the exactly opposite group. After all, it is the borrowers'
notions of the effect of signing as maker or indorser which are to be
76. Id. at 1057-1058. Compare Daniel's view of the justification for Fenlum v. Po-
cock and Manley v. Boycot, supra note 71.
77. Id. at 1058.
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determined and not the lenders' opinions of the borrowers' notions. If
an "unselected" group is not to be "sampled," should not a group of
known accommodation parties be "selected"? Since their reactions would
be recorded as of after the fact of signing, their responses should no
doubt be checked, as for example, against the Keeler polyograph, or
lie-detector.'
But the writer's impressions are that the average accommodation
maker, unacquainted with the legal implications that may arise from the
position of his signature on an instrument and equally uninitiated in
credit practices, would not read into an instrument, which recited only
that he promised to pay a certain amount on a certain day, any implied
consent to the holder's extension of time to the accommodated party by
which he would be bound as well. Much less would he read into such an
instrument any implied consent to a release of the principal debtor by
the holder which would be effective against him. And when the law
supplies some of the terms of the instrument, those terms should not
depart from the ordinary meaning of the words actually used, until or
unless that meaning can be demonstrated to have defeated the com-
mercial purposes for which the instrument is designed. This suggests
the need for a factual study to determine whether the existence of the
rights of sureties on commercial paper impedes its currency among
lenders.
Furthermore, it is doubtful that the average accommodation signer
usually has any choice as to whether he will sign as accommodation maker
or indorser.79 On the other hand, if the creditor demands for his greater
security a "waiver of defenses" - as of extension of time - he may
phrase a clause with that effect to which the accommodation maker will
usually not be in a position to object; and, while, if he does not object,
he will be no better off than if the rule of Sections 192, 119 and 120
obtained,"0 at least he will be apprised at the outset of his lack of defenses.
Moreover, insertion of an express waiver requires positive action at
the time the contract is entered into; and, while the creditor, because
78. That there are other, statistical, methods for insuring greater dependability, see
the several studies of Stuart Rice and Herman C. Beyle on measuring public opinion
and attitudes.
79. Again the writer can offer only his casual, but verifiable, observation: notes
issued by corporate lenders standardly provide for co-maker loans or, by express con-
tractual provision, take from the accommodation indorser much of the adwantage of the
position of his signature on the note. While the loan officers in requiring these forms are
responding only to this standardization, these forms doubtless have been drafted by the
legal department with all the legal implications thereof in mind.
80. But that such an express waiver of defenses might avoid oppression occasioned
by apparent collusion between accommodated party and holder where the blunt rule of
§§ 192-119-120 would not do so, see Tuten v. Bowden, 173 S. C. 25t, 175 S. r. 510
(1934) (prior consent to "any extension of time" construed as nut authorizing suc-
cessive extensions over a sixteen-year period).
1941]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
of his superior bargaining position, can very probably obtain consent in
advance to an extension of time, it is not so likely that he could then
obtain consent to releasing the principal debtor who, at that time, it is
ordinarily assumed, will actually pay the instrument. Without such an
express waiver clause, it is difficult to see any commercial purpose to
be served by refusing the discharge, other than the possible need to
promote negotiability, that would warrant the creditor's being allowed
so flagrant an opportunity to oppress."'
It has been suggested in further denial of the injustice of the earlier
rule under the Negotiable Instruments Law that, in terms of the total
amount of obligations, most present-day accommodation is effected
by corporate stockholders or officers signing to accommodate their cor-
porations and that "in neither of [these] situations are the refinements
of common law suretyship particularly appropriate." 2 This statement
may be conceded both as to fact and conclusion; yet it stands only as
an argument that accommodation parties of this sort be accorded special
treatment. Indeed, it has been suggested that stockholders and officers
"accommodating" their corporations ought not to be regarded as parties
who sign "without receiving value therefor." 3 But in any event, in the
hundred-odd cases examined in this study, except in a very few cases,
such was not the character of the accommodation parties involved.
EFFECT ON NEGOTIABILITY OF THE RULE PERMITTING DISCHARGE
No factual analysis was made to support the assertion that the rule
of Pooley v. Harradine interfered with the currency of commercial paper;
and perhaps a poll of present, past, and future holders of accommodation
commercial paper should have preceded the writer's assertion of the
contrary view. But it is thought that some value remains in a more
traditional approach to the question.
The currency of commercial paper hardly seems affected by a rule
that requires only that a holder abstain from impairing the known rights
of another, the while retaining all his own rights to enforce the letter
of his contract. To promote negotiability, holders in clue course should
indeed be "free from any defect of title of prior parties, and be free
from defenses available to prior parties among themselves" and entitled
to "enforce payment of the instrument for the full amount thereof.
81. This suggests yet another factual study: to what extent, under the earlier Ne-
gotiable Instruments Law rule or with an express waiver of releases or extensions, does
such oppression occur? For seeming judicial recognition that it does occur, see Ver-
non Center State Bank v. Mangelsen, 166 Minn. 472, 208 N. W. 186 (1926). See note
80 supra.
82. Turner [Steffen], Revision of the Negotiable Instrunsents Law (1928) 38 YALE
L. J. 25, 49.
83. Comment (1935) 19 MARQ. L. REv. 122, 125.
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S- .," And mere knowledge of the accommodation character of the
instrument should not defeat these rights."8 But the discharge of the
accommodation maker or acceptor does not, under the rule of Pooley v.
Harradine, result from any "defect of title of prior parties" or "defenses
available to prior parties among themselves," or even merely from the
holder's knowledge of the accommodation character of the instrument.
The accommodation party does not assert the kind of dfeise of which
the currency of commercial paper requires that holders in due course
be freed. He claims, however, a discharge, by reason of the holder's own
conduct subsequent to his having acquired knowledge of the accommo-
dation, from a liability that would otherwise subsist despite the holder's
knowledge. Surely, the currency of negotiable instruments does not
require that the holder in due course be free, not only from prior defects
and defenses, but from the consequences of his own subsequent ineq-
uitable conduct as well."8
But, if it is said that the mere existence of the latent suretyship is
after all the ultimate source of the accommodation party's discharge and
that it is therefore to be likened to a defense "available to prior parties
among themselves," which should be cut off by transfer as respects an
indorsee without prior or contemporaneous notice of the fact of surety-
ship, the question arises whether this immunity from the rule allowing
the discharge should be extended to one who, in all other respects a holder
in due course, does have knowledge of the suretyship when the instru-
ment is transferred to him.
Even if furtherance of currency of bills and notes should require
extension of immunity from the rule to such an indorsee, there seems
no reason for extending this immunity to an original payee who has
notice of the suretyship. The promotion of negotiability, if it requires
any modification in the Pooley v. Harradine rule at all, would seem to
be sufficiently served by protecting from the operation of the rule of
discharge those indorsees who are in all respects holders in due course
or, at most, those indorsees who are holders in due course in all respects
other than their knowledge of the suretyship at the time of taking the
instrument." Yet the earlier rule under the Negotiable Instruments Law
extended the immunity to all holders of commercial paper under an inter-
pretation denying the discharge as readily to patent as to latent sureties.
Such promotion of circulation - if that alone occasioned the change in
the law- might be likened to calling on . olus to ventilate a cottage.
84. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 57.
85. See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUM NTS LAW § 29.
86. BRANwNAN'S NEGOTLABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (3d ed. 1920) 315; Hening, The
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, Is It Producing Uniformity in the Law A!er-
chalnt? (1911) 59 U. oF PA. L. REv. 532, 546; McMahon, Surcties uider the Ncgotiablc
Instruments Law (1910) 8 OHIo L. RE . 25, 30.
87. See note 5 supra.
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AMENDMENT AND REINTERPRETATION
If the above discussion has made clear the necessity for replacing the
rule of the Cellers and Vanderford cases with that of Pooley v. Harra-
dine, there remains the question whether this change requires an amend-
ment of the Negotiable Instruments Law, or merely reintcrpretation, or
both.
The most meritorious objection to amendment- that it not be done
piece-meal 8 - has been met. Successive committees of the Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have reported a compre-
hensive set of amendments, including amendments to Section 120, which
substitute the term "a party to a negotiable instrument" for the term
"a person secondarily liable" in the introductory sentence. The amend-
ment first suggested by the Conference8 deleted all reference to surety-
ship bases for discharge, thus proposing to make clear a return to the
rules of suretyship supervening the law of negotiable instruments. This
amendment has been adopted only in West Virginia, with an additional
disclaimer of any reference to the law of suretyship,90 although not in
the form suggested by Professor Britton, who foresaw the continued
influence, via textbook and encyclopedia learning, of the Cellers and
Vanderford cases." The unkind fate accorded this amendment in Mar-
shall County Bank v. Fenner92 may have suggested the need for pro-
viding expressly in the Negotiable Instruments Law for the discharge
of surety makers and acceptors. In any event, the amendment now
proposed so provides.
93
An additional argument against amendment is that the rule of Pooley
v. Harradine can be restored by reinterpretation of the Act; 4 and so
88. Hargest, Keeping the Uniform State Laws Uniform (1927) 76 U. oF PA. L. REv.
178; Beutel, The Negotiable Instrumcnts Act Should Not Be Amended (1932) 80 U. or.
PA. L. REV. 368.
89. Britton, Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Lazo
(1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 815, 830-831.
90. "This section does not include the rules governing the discharge of a surety or
party secondarily liable because of such secondary liability." BRANNAN'S NEGOTIAmUE
INSTRUMENTs LAW (6th ed. 1938) Statutory Variations, 65.
91. Britton, Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
(1928) 22 ILL. L. REv. 815, 831 suggests that "it might be well to add that the section
shall not be interpreted to deprive any party to an instrument of any right which he
may have under the law of suretyship."
92. 113 W. Va. 451, 168 S. E. 375 (1933).
93. STEFFEN, CASES ON COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT PAPER (1939) Statutory Ma-
terial, 57.
94. Beutel, The Negotiable Instruments Act Should Not Be Amended (1932) 80 U.
OF PA. L. Rav. 368. See also Beutel, The Necessity of a New Technique of Interpretlnlt
the N. L L.-The Civil Law Analogy (1931) 6 TULANE L. Rav. 1; Beutel, Common Law
Judicial Technique and the Law of Negotiable Instruments-Two Unfortmate Decisions
(1934) 9 TULANE L. Rv. 64.
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it can. Indeed, since the proposed amendment has yet been nowhere
adopted, reinterpretation is needed in the interim. But, as will presently
appear, Section 58- the provision of the Act first, and most often since,
appealed to-merely limits the doctrine of the Cellers and Vanderford
cases to the situation of an indorsee who is a holder in due course, which
is still a far cry from restoring the rule of Pooley v. Harradihe; and
Section 119(4)-later appealed to-may do no more. Hence, an inter-
pretation or interpretations of the Act not yet accepted must be pressed
upon the courts and, even with that, amendment and reinterpretation in
mutual aid of each other must be urged.
LATER DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW - SO-CALLED MINORITY RULE - SECTION 58
The first dissent from the denial of the surety's discharge was an-
nounced in 1908 by the Iowa court, in Fullerton Lumber Co. v.
Snouffer. 5 Gaining acceptance only slowly at first, the Fullerton case
possibly might now be found to represent the "majority" trend under
the Negotiable Instrumnents Law." Admitting that Sections 192, 119
and 120 precluded the discharge of accommodation parties primarily
liable as against holders in due course, the Iowa court held that, since
the "entire scope and purpose of the act, so far, at least, as it affects
the question before us, is to fix the rights of holders in due course,"
by virtue of Section 58 "said act is not applicable" at all where the
question arises between the surety party and the original payee, or other
holder not in any respect a holder in due course."7 So stated, this appeal
to Section 58 can be met all too easily:- the Negotiable Instruments
Law applies to instruments that are negotiable in form; the fact that an
instrument negotiable in form is not negotiated by the payee leaves it
nonetheless subject to the Negotiable Instruments Law; and Sections
192, 119 and 120 are not restricted in terms or in their judicial inter-
pretation to situations involving holders in due course.1s
More aptly stated,"0 decisions applying Section 58 may be said to view
the status of suretyship, coupled with a knowing interference therewith,
95. 139 Iowa 176, 117 N. W. 50 (1908).
96. See successive annotations in Notes (1927) 48 A. L. R. 715, 725; (1930) 65 A.
L. R. 1425, 1426; (1937) 108 A. L. R. 1088, 1092. It is referred to as "the modern trend
and majority interpretation of the Negotiable Instruments Act" in State Nat. Bank v.
Thompson, 277 Ky. 527, 532, 126 S. W. (2d) 412, 415 (1939).
97. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Snouffer, 139 Iowa 176, 178, 117 N. W. 50 (1903).
98. First State Bank v. Williams, 164 Ky. 143, 175 S. IV. 10 (1915) ; Sloan v. Gates,
166 Tenn. 446, 62 S. W. (2d) 52 (1933).
99. See, e.g., Newldrk v. Hays, 220 Mo. App. 514, 275 S. W. 964 (1925); Hardin
Trust Co. v. Wollard, 119 Neb. 307, 228 N. WN. 866 (1930); Case Threshing Mach. Co.
v. Howth, 116 Tex. 434, 293 S. IV. 800 (1927).
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as a defense forecloseable by negotiation. In this view (although this
is not recognized in the cases) the discharge should be available not
merely against payees, or holders not otherwise holders in due course,
but against holders who, although they are in all other respects holders
in due course, have notice of the accommodation when they take the
instrument, as in the very early case of Laxton v. Peat.
One answer to this view of the effect of Section 58, made in cases
denying the discharge under Sections 192, 119 and 120, is that Section
29 cuts down the scope of Section 58 as respects defenses available to
accommodation parties.' 0 Another answer is that the court in the Ful-
lerton case was able to discharge the accommodation party under Sec-
tion 58 because Iowa did not then recognize that a payee may be a holder
in due course, whereas the better view is that he may.' If the refuta-
tion of this view of the effect of Section 58 depended on these con-
tentions alone, it could be successfully withstood, for they may be given
short shrift indeed. The first argument may be refuted by stating that
Section 29 does not deprive an accommodation party of defenses other
than the mere want of consideration for the instrument running directly
to him;102 that mere knowledge of accommodation, not followed by an
interference with that status, has never been thought to be the basis
for a surety's discharge; that some defenses, despite the unhappy phras-
ing of Section 29, are available to an accommodation party that are
peculiar to him;1°3 and that Section 29, moreover, by its reference to
"accommodation parties," includes within its proper meaning accommo-
dation parties secondarily liable whose discharge for release or extension
of time is expressly provided for in Section 120(5) and (6). As to
the second view, while a payee may be a holder in due course, the cir-
cumstances under which he may be so are not necessarily, or even usually,
those surrounding the giving of credit to one person on the instrument
of another;1°4 nor did anything appear in the cases where this refuta-
tion of the Fullerton case was attempted to indicate circumstances under
which the payees therein involved would be holders in due course within
the meaning of the rule that they may occupy that favored position in
a proper case. A better criticism of the cases allowing the discharge
under Section 58 would have been that, if the surety's discharge is a
defense within the meaning of that Section, the protection of holders
in due course against its interposition would be sufficiently assured under
100. Vernon Center State Bank v. Mangelsen, 166 Minn. 472, 208 N. W. 186 (1926);
Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Smith, 59 Mont. 280, 196 Pac. 523 (1921).
101. Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Carter, 165 Tenn. 628, 57 S. W. (2d) 449 (1933) ; see
cases cited supra note 100.
102. Note (1935) 95 A. L. R. 964, 978.
103. Id. at 980.
104. Feezer, May the Payee of a Negotiable Instrument Be a Holder in Due Course?
(1925) 9 MINN. L. Rev. 101.
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the general provisions of Section 57 without any need to call in Sec-
tions 192, 119 and 120 to protect holders in due course in this single
instance.
But, in stating the real objections to this interpretation of Section 58
as a rebirth of the rule of Laxton v. Peat, it must be emphasized that
the surety's equity, entitling him to be discharged, is not a defense within
the meaning of that Section. To allow the discharge under Section 58
is to confuse the different qualities of a defense which is available to
the maker as a surety against the actor, and a defense which is available
to the maker as a party to the instrument, against one not a holder in
due course, not himself the actor, if it was available against a party
prior to such holder. Hence, the real objections to appealing to Section
58 are that it greatly limits the scope of the rule allowing the discharge
and yet has created the impression in many quarters that a return to the
prior rule is being accomplished without need for further reinterpreta-
tion, or amendment, or both.'
LATER DEVELOPMENT UNDER THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW- SECTION 119(4)
In the search for authority for the discharge, much consideration has
been given to Section 119(4). As early as 1911 Professor Brannan
urged the Section as the basis for the accommodation maker's dis-
charge,'-" at least alternatively to Section 196. Professor Beutel, an
eminent authority, finds the discharge expressly provided for in Section
119(4), although with a curious notion of its interrelation with Sec-
tions 58 and 196 in this respect.0 7 Other writers, too, have approved
Section 119(4) as the basis for the discharge.108 Since this ground for
allowing the discharge has recently been gaining some favor in the
courts,' it may be well to state briefly the logical inapplicability of the
Section.
105. See Roberts, Dcfenses of an Accommodation Maker (1938) 23 Iowa L RmE.
335; Ousley, Extension of Time for Payment as Releasing Sureties on Note is KCntucky
(1934) 22 Ky. L. J. 371; see cases cited supra note 99.
106. BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE IXSTRUMENTs LAW (2d ed. 1911) 117.
107. BRANxAN'S NEOTI-%BLE INIsTRUME Ts LAw (6th ed. 1938) 972-973.
108. Raymond, Suretyship at "Law Merchant" (1916) 30 HARv. L. REv. 141; Greeley,
The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law in the Light of Recent Criticism (1915) 10
IL. L. REv. 265; see spra note 105.
109. Citizens' State Bank v. Rosenwald, 63 S. D. 50, 256 N. \W. 264 (1934) is prob-
ably the only case squarely in point. North Dakota has allowed the discharge because
of surrender of collateral under § 119(4). Scandinavian Amer. Bank v. Westby, 41 N. D.
276, 172 N. IV. 665 (1918) ; State Bank v. Edwards, 45 N. D. 341, 177 N. N%. 677 (1920).
This does not necessarily imply that the North Dakota court would allow discharge as
well for release or extension of time, for Ohio has allowed the discharge because of sur-
render of collateral under § 119(4) and impliedly restricted its application to that ground.
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The most obvious objection is that Section 119, including subsection 4,
relates to the discharge of instruments, not to the discharge of parties
as such, and that the discharge of a surety party, even if effected by
"any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment
of money," will not discharge the instrument where the accommodated
debtor is a party either primarily or secondarily liable, as he usually is,
and where the "act" is an extension rather than a release. 1 To say, as
has been said, that the extension of time or release discharges the instru-
ment as far as the surety party primarily liable is concerned, is to evade
the question."' Again, to say that "any other act which will discharge
a simple contract for the payment of money" will discharge a surety
assumes the very question to be decided: whether an act which would
discharge a surety before the passage of the Negotiable Instruments
Law discharges him under the statute.' This question-begging charac-
teristic of Section 119(4) was early pointed out.""
These objections aside, there is a somewhat more practical objection
to the use of Section 119(4) as the basis for discharge. To come even
remotely within the language of Section 119(4), the discharge must
result from the holder's breach of an agreement to treat the accommo-
dation maker as surety- a fact which is dimly recognized in the cases
applying Section 119(4) and apparently fully realized by Professor
Beutel." 4 Breach of a contract to treat the acceptor as surety was not
the rationale of Pooley v. Harradine but of Fentum v. Pocock and Man-
ley v. Boycot, but it is a conceivable basis for the discharge. If it is ac-
cepted, however, the scope of the discharge may be even more restricted
than apparently is conceded by Professor Beutel," 5 who sees the difficulty
in spelling out such an agreement by an indorsee who takes the instru-
ment without knowledge of its accommodation character. Even if the
indorsee knows of the suretyship when he takes the instrument, the
Goodman v. Goodman, 127 Ohio St. 223, 187 N. E. 777 (1933). Discharge of the maker
of a mortgage note has been allowed under § 119(4) because of an extension of time to
his grantee of the mortgaged premises. Industrial Trust Co. v. Goldman, 59 R. 1. 11,
193 Atl. 852 (1937) (decision expressly restricted to particular situation).
110. This was recognized and the appeal to § 119(4) rejected in Case Threshing Mach.
Co. v. Bridger, 133 La. 754, 63 So. 319 (1913) (allowing discharge under civil code pro-
visions and, perhaps, § 196) ; Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N. E. 679
(1912); Richards v. Market Exch. Bank Co., 81 Ohio St. 348, 90 N. E, 1000 (1910);
Wolstenholme v. Smith, 34 Utah 300, 97 Pac. 329 (1908). All these cases denied the
discharge.
111. But this was so stated in Scandinavian Amer. Bank v. Westby, 41 N. D. 276,
172 N. W. 665 (1918), approved in Smith v. Blackford, 56 S. D. 360, 228 N. W. 466
(1929) (involving discharge of maker of mortgage note).
112. Wolstenholme v. Smith, 34 Utah 300, 97 Pac. 329 (1908).
113. McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law (1902) 50 AM. L. REG. (N.s.) 499.
114. BRANNAN'S NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (6th ed. 1938) 973-974.
115. Id. at 974.
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parol evidence rule seems to stand in the way of proof of the agreement.
Indeed, unless the accommodation maker adds appropriately descriptive
words to his signature, or the instrument's terms otherwise expose an
ambiguity with respect to his position (as conceivably where he is co-
maker), it seems impossible to prove the existence of the agreement to
treat the maker as surety even as against an original payee. This inter-
pretation seems so vulnerable that it is unlikely that it will move courts
already denying the discharge because of Sections 192, 119 and 120 to
change their positions, except perhaps to obviate such manifest absurdities
as the Cellers and Lenoir decisions.
Of course, if the courts take the attitude, in effect, that the con-
tract to treat the accommodation maker as surety is implied by law
and not implied in fact, this is tantamount to the rationale of Poohy
v. Harradine, merely expressed differently and more laboriously. This
is, indeed, equivalent to saying that Section 119(4) means that any
act which will discharge a party at common law will do so under
the statute. And one hesitates to impart to a Section, criticized for
meaning the wrong thing and again as meaning nothing,110 the meaning
of "everything else unprovided for," -especially when Section 196 is
as readily available for that express purpose. But should the courts let
themselves be persuaded to take this view of Section 119(4), " one will
scarcely look a gift horse in the mouth when combating interpretations
of the statute based on Cellers v. Meachem and Vanderford v. Farmers'
& Mechanics' National Bank.
A REINTERPRETATION OF SECTION 120
Another argument favoring the discharge has been based upon the
construction of Section 120. There is some reason to believe that this
Section was not in fact intended to abrogate the discharge of accom-
modation makers and acceptors as sureties, for it can with a little diffi-
culty itself be reinterpreted as allowing their discharge. Because of the
definition in Section 192 of the term "person secondarily liable," the use
of the term in the introductory sentence of Section 120 has been made
the basis for excluding parties primarily liable from the operation of
subsections 120(5) and (6), which provide for discharge because of
release or extension of time. Yet, although subsections 1 to 4, relating
to grounds of discharge other than those based on principles of surety-
ship, are governed by the same introductory statement, their effect is not
116. McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Lazo (1902) 50 Am. L RrZ. (.s.) 499
(with respect to discharge of the instrument).
117. Does the discharge of the maker of a mortgage note because of extension of
time to the grantee of the mortgaged premises require this view of § 119(4)? See
note 109 supra. The special question of a surety's discharge in this circumstance %6il be
the subject of a subsequent article.
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denied to parties primarily liable. And, although it may be said that
this result can be arrived at by reference to other provisions of the
Act,18 it is not without significance that suggested amendments to Sec-
tion 120 substitute the term "a party to a negotiable instrument" for
the term "a person secondarily liable.""
' 9
If such confusion in terminology exists throughout Section 120, it
does not seem unreasonable to suppose that the draftsmen were confusing
the negotiable instruments and suretyship senses in which "secondary
party," or "secondary liability," may be used.' In any event, if the
statutory term "person secondarily liable" is read, in connection with
subsections (5) and (6), in the suretyship sense of "secondary party,"
it is "not without interest to note that . . . much if not all difficulty
of interpretation is at once eliminated, and familiar Common-Law prin-
ciples of suretyship stand out in fairly clear perspective."'
21
Nor would this interpretation of "person secondarily liable" in Sec-
tion 120 necessarily conflict with the definition of parties given in
Section 192. Not all the parties concerned with negotiable paper and
referred to in the Negotiable Instruments Law are defined in Section
192. Section 29 contains its own definition of accommodation parties,
whose position on the paper would otherwise bring them within the
definition of Section 192 but who are referred to and accorded separate
treatment as accommodation parties in other sections. 22 Moreover, the
term "principal debtor," a suretyship and not a negotiable instruments
term, is used several times throughout the statute ;12 and, significantly,
that term, and not "party primarily liable," is used in Section 120(5)
in contradistinction to "person secondarily liable." Thus the definition
of parties in Section 192 might be said to relate only to the liability of
parties "on the instrument" and not at all to a status outside the instru-
ment, derived from circumstances known to the holder but neither ap-
pearing on the instrument nor affecting the liability thereon.
The suggested construction, while strained, involves little more in the
way of linguistic gymnastics than is needed to interpret other provisions
of the Negotiable Instruments Law in order to reach desirable results
consonant with the prior law but not available under the Act's literal
wording.'24 Indeed, courts have found it necessary to depart from the
118. NE OTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 120(1), 123, 70, 87, 119(4).
119. See notes 89 and 93 supra.
120. As to early and recurring confusion of the ideas of secondary and accessorial, or
collateral, liability, see 2 HARE & WALLACE, Am. L. CAS. (5th ed. 1871) 431. For a
clarification of these troublesome terms, see Arnold, Primary and Secondary Obligations
(1925) 74 U. OF PA. L. REv. 36.
121. BIGELOW, BILLS, NoTs, AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) 497, n. 2.
122. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§64(3), 80, 114(3), 115(3), 121(2).
123. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 87, 119.
124. For a single example, see Mueller v. Jagerson Fuel Co., 203 Wis. 453, 233 N. W.
633 (1930) (construing § 119(5)).
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literal wording of Section 120 itself for other purposes ;125 and "approved"
constructions of Sections 58 and 119(4) on this problem are no less
strained and fall short of fully re-establishing the prior rule. But
this interpretation of Section 120 has after all been disavowed by its
draftsmen;"2 the use of the term "principal debtor" in Section 120(5)
has been explained as merely forestalling the absurd result of otherwise
having the "release of the 'party primarily liable' (e.g., accommodation
maker or acceptor)" effect the discharge of "the accominnodated indorser,
the ultimate debtor" ;127 and this construction has found no support in
the cases and virtually none from the textwriters.' While proposed
amendments to the Act would restore the rule of Pooley v. Harradine
by giving Section 120 the very meaning suggested," 2 until such amend-
ments are adopted, restoration of the rule of Pooley v,. Harradine, which
cannot be accomplished under Section 58 or as certainly under Section
119(4), may be far more readily accomplished under Section 196 than
under Section 120 as now worded.
THE WAY TO SECTION 196
If the draftsmen of the Negotiable Instruments Law intended to ex-
clude the discharge of accommodation parties primarily liable, their
phrasing of Section 120 did not succeed in doing so in express terms.
To achieve that interpretation the Callers, Vanderford, and succeeding
cases resorted to an implication from the juxtaposition of Sections 119
and 120 and to the use of the maxim expressio unius est exchsio alterius.
Another canon of construction, "that statutes in derogation of the com-
mon law are to be narrowly construed," would have been more appro-
priate in view of the state of the prior law and the propriety of a surety's
discharge. An interpretation of these Sections, which seems as reasonable
as the other, could be expressed thus: Section 119 relates to the discharge
of instruments and not to the discharge of parties primarily liable; its
juxtaposition to Section 120 therefore has no necessary significance here.
Section 120 relates to the discharge as sureties of parties secondarily
liable. The discharge as sureties of parties primarily liable is nowhere
expressly provided for; but neither is it anywhere expressly denied. Theirs
is, therefore, an omitted case and governed by the prior law under the
very language of Section 196, particularly since statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be narrowly construed. This interpretation
125. In regard to NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENz'S LAW § 120(3), see BrANN .AN's NECOTI-
ABLE INSTRUM-ExTS LAW (6th ed. 1938) 990 ct seq.
126. See p. 396 supra.
127. BIGELow, Bn.Ls, NOTES, AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) 500.
128. Street, Effect of Negotiable Inslrunents Law on Liability of Surely (1907) 11
LAW NOTES 105; see BIGELOW, BILLS, NOTES, AND CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) 497, n. 2.
129. See notes 89 and 93 supra.
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was early suggested by Professor Brannan, 30 alternatively to the use
of Section 119(4), and approved by other writers. 131 Thus far, how-
ever, except for the discharge of the maker of a mortgage note because
of an extension to the grantee of the mortgaged premises"8 2 and possibly
the discharge of an accommodation maker because of the surrender or
impairment of collateral" 3 --cases which most frequently rest on reasoning
restricting the application of Section 196 to these specific situations'
- this interpretation of the statute has little support in the cases. 103
There also are cases which allow the discharge of accommodation makers
because of release or extension of time without citing either the Act or
cases decided under the Act, which might be interpreted as applying Sec-
tion 196 sub silentio.136
Yet this interpretation might well be adopted by a court, whose atten-
tion was also called to the history of Fentitn v. Pocock and the reason
behind Pooley v. Harradine, where such a court would be unable to bring
itself to the suggested reinterpretation of Section 120 or would balk at
the strained constructions to be made and the theoretical objections to
be met in allowing the discharge under Sections 58 or 119(4). More
important, the appeal to Section 196 would allow the discharge as freely
as under the prior law and not in the limited scope required by Section
58, and possibly by Section 119(4). Certainly, unless or until Section
120 is amended as now proposed, the courts should be directed in this
regard to Section 196, via Pooley v. Harradine and Bailey v. Edwards.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
There is no reason why latent sureties on negotiable instruments should
not, like ordinary sureties, be discharged because of release or extension
of time. Since the discharge results from the holder's own act only after
130. BRANNAN'S NFGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (2d ed. 1911) 117.
131. Street, Effect of the Negotiable Instruments Law on Liability ol the Surely
(1907) 11 LAW NoTEs 105; see works cited supra notes 105 and 108. Not all of these
writers see that it is necessary to turn wholly away from § 119(4) and, certainly, away
from § 58 if the discharge is to be allowed in its widest scope.
132. Isaacs v. Van Hoose, 171 La. 676, 131 So. 845 (1930); Wilkinson v. Adams,
179 La. 630, 154 So. 630 (1934). See also Smith v. Davis, 67 Colo. 128, 186 Pac. 519
(1920) ; Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lindley, 97 Ind. App. 575, 183 N. E. 127 (1932),
133. Rommel Bros. v. Clark, 255 Ky. 554, 74 S. W. (2d) 933 (1934) (may rest on
§ 58).
134. These will be the subject of a subsequent article.
135. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Bridger, 133 La. 754, 63 So. 319 (1913) (may
depend in part on LA. CIv. CODE (Dart, 1932), Art. 2203, expressly providing for dis-
charge of co-maker because of release, etc.) ; Hederman v. Cox, 193 So. 19 (Miss. 1940)
(though § 196 not cited, expressly rejects early N. I. L. majority view; return to the
uncodified law suggested by citation of early cases).
136. See, e.g., Ray v. Summerlin, 211 Ala. 334, 100 So. 482 (1924) ; Finch v. Provi-
dent Mut. Life Ins. Co., 55 Ga. App. 518, 190 S. E. 675 (1937).
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he knows of the suretyship and not from his mere knowledge of the
suretyship or from any act transpiring between the surety and a prior
holder, the discharge would not interfere with the currency of commer-
cial paper. Hence the discharge should be available even against indorsees
in all respects holders in due course on taking the instrument. All this
was so well established before the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments
Law that there was hardly a dissentient from the rule allowing the dis-
charge. Yet, first interpretations under the statute found the Act to
abrogate the rule entirely, and later interpretations fall short of re-estab-
lishing the prior rule.
Since it does not clearly appear that the Act was intended to abrogate
the rule permitting discharge or even to modify its scope, the result under
'the statute may have been merely the consequence of ineptitude in drafting
the Act and in interpreting its provisions. Added to this, there may have
been a certain judicial hostility toward allowing the surety's total dis-
charge because of release or extension of time without allegation and
proof of actual damage. Further, the historical accident of the first inter-
pretations of the Negotiable Instruments Law in this connection, coupled
with the rigidifying effect of codification and the plea for a uniform in-
terpretation of a uniform statute, played a part in establishing the early
rule under the Act; and a similar snow-ball-rolling-down-hill judicial
process in the later attempt to restore the prior rule led to an accumu-
lation of cases which restricted the scope of the discharge in their attempts
to restore it.
The essential justice of the prior rule is evidenced somewhat by the
rapid rise of the "minority" rule under the statute in the face of the plea
for uniform interpretation and by the official proposal of an anendment
to restore the prior rule in its widest scope. But amendment is all too
slow in coming, and the so-called minority interpretations unnecessarily
limit the scope of a surety's discharge. Yet the prior rule can be restored,
as it need never have been abolished or modified, by a reinterpretation
of Section 120 or, more certainly, by an appeal to Section 196.
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